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Monzie: The Right to a Special Education

COMMENTS

THE RIGHT TO A SPECIAL EDUCATION
Kathleen S. Monzie
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.

-- Chief Justice Earl Warren'
I. INTRODUCTION

With these words, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education established the importance of an education in America
and the necessity for equal educational opportunity in the
nation's schools. These precepts were originally articulated in the
context of racial equality; however, they have been invoked repeatedly by school reform advocates challenging the constitutionality of the states' school finance systems and the treatment of
disabled students in the classroom.
Over the past twenty-five years, concerned citizens in a
majority of states have pursued litigation aimed at curing the
persistent financial disparities between school districts.2 Early
lawsuits illuminated these wealth-based disparities in the
nation's schools and, in the tradition of Brown, called upon the
courts to overturn the funding systems that perpetuate this type
of inequity.3

1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 185-94 (1995).
3.

See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989);

Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Robinson v. Cahill,
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As the courts applied the concept of equal educational opportunity to the school finance lawsuits in the early 1970's, they
also examined the issue of the unequal treatment of disabled
students.4 Litigants in these lawsuits were concerned with the
total exclusion as well as the "constructive" exclusion of handicapped children from the classroom.5 The latter argument was
based on the assertion that even though disabled students may
be present in the classroom, they are excluded from the benefits
of the instruction if it is not appropriate to their individual needs
and abilities.6 In response to the success of these suits, Congress
enacted statutes guaranteeing disabled
students the right to a
7
education."
public
appropriate
"free
The initial disabled students and school finance lawsuits,
like Brown, relied on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as the legal
basis of their claims of inequality and discrimination.' In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,' however, the
Supreme Court rejected the use of the Equal Protection Clause
by concluding that there is no federal constitutional right to a
public education.1" In response to this setback, school finance
reform advocates turned to the use of state constitutions to pursue their claims," while disabled students began to rely on federal statutes for relief. 2 This dichotomy resulted in educational
reform in some states aimed at providing equal opportunity to a
quality education. 3 However, disabled students continued to
303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
4.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343
F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972).
5.
Merle McClung, Do Handicapped Children Have a Legal Right to a Minimally Adequate Education?, 3 J.L. & ED. 153 (1974).
6. See 3 JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 10.03[1][a], at 122 (1995).
7. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA), Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400-01, 1405-06, 1411-20 (1994)) (renamed the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in 1990).
8.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."); see, e.g., McInnis v. Shapiro, 293
F. Supp. 327, 331-37 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd mem. sub nom., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394
U.S. 322 (1969); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 872-77 (D. Minn. 1971).
9.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
10. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33, 35.
11.
See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation,
19 J.L. & ED. 219, 225-31 (1990) [hereinafter Thro, The Third Wave].
12. See Rapp, supra note 6, at 122.
13. See, e.g., McDuffy v. Secretary of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993) (hold-
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depend on federal law to assert their right to minimal educational opportunities. 4
In 1993, a school finance reform lawsuit and a disabled
students' lawsuit converged for the first time in Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt.5 In this far-reaching case, the Alabama Circuit Court found that all school-age children, regular
education students as well as disabled students, have "an enforceable constitutional right to an education," 6 and the Alabama public school system violated this right. 7 In addition, the
court ruled that children with disabilities have a state statutory
right to an appropriate education." Finally, the court found the
method of funding the state special education program unconstitutional. 9
This decision will undoubtedly have a substantial impact on
the public school children of Alabama; yet, the implications could
ultimately reach far beyond the borders of that state. Instead of
relying solely on federal statutory rights of disabled students to
an equal educational opportunity, plaintiffs can cite Alabama
Coalition for the proposition that disabled students have a right
to a quality education based on state constitutional and statutory
provisions. Furthermore, this right could be used as the vehicle
for overturning inadequate special education programs nationwide.
This Comment will explore the Alabama Coalition decision
as an important development in this area of law. Part II gives an

ing that the public education system violates the state's constitutional duty to "cherish" the public schools as contained in MASS. CONST. Part 1II, ch. 5, § 2); Tennessee
Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 156 (Tenn. 1993) (declaring that the
essential elements of the state's education system must be measured in terms of
quality and equality of education, not just equality of funding); Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989) ("A bandaid will not suffice; the
system itself must be changed."); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186,
211-12 (Ky. 1989) (ordering a complete restructuring of the state education system
based on a detailed list of seven substantive standards articulated by the court, e.g.
"(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in
a complex and rapidly changing civilization; . . . (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable
each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently . .
").
14. See Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 200 (1982) (declaring that EAHCA only guarantees an education designed
to offer disabled students "some educational benefits") (emphasis added).
15. Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, appendix to Opinion of the
Justices No. 338, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993).
16. Id. at 147-62.
17. Id. at 110.
18. Id. at 163.
19. Id. at 164.
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historical overview of the evolution of school finance reform litigation and the legal theories postulated in its support. Part III
examines two landmark disabled student lawsuits and the legislation that followed those decisions. Part IV discusses the Alabama Coalition decision and the Alabama Circuit Court's analysis of applicable state and federal law. Part V compares Alabama
Coalition to the Montana school finance case, Helena Elementary
School District No. 1 v. State,"° which found the state system of
public school funding unconstitutional but did not address special education issues. Parts IV and V also analyze the respective
legislative action which followed the two suits. Finally, Part VI
compares the Montana and Alabama special education statutes
and raises the question of whether an Alabama Coalition-type
challenge could be successful in Montana and other states whose
constitutional and statutory provisions are similar to those of
Alabama.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM
LITIGATION

The school finance reform movement springs from the states'
use of local property taxes for a significant portion of school
funding.2 1 Because the location is such an important factor in
determining value, taxes linked to property values can vary
enormously between school districts." The resulting disparity
in per-pupil expenditures has a significant impact on the type of
education that can be provided.2 3 In response to these school
funding inequities, school reform advocates across the country
have launched numerous legal challenges to school finance systems over the last quarter-century.2 4

20.

236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989).

21. See Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts,
104 HARV. L. REV. 1072, 1073 (1991). Hawaii is the only state that does not use
local property taxes to fund public education. All other states have enacted financing
systems that rely heavily on taxes raised from real property. William E. Thro, The
Significance of the Tennessee School Finance Decision, 85 EDUC. L. REP. 11, 13 (1993)
[hereinafter Thro, The Significance].
22.
Low tax rates in property-rich districts can generate substantial revenues
for the schools, while high tax rates in property-poor districts generate lesser
amounts. Note, supra note 21, at 1073; see Note, Equal Educational Opportunity
Revisited: Abbott v. Burke and the 'Thorough and Efficient" Law in New Jersey, 40
RUTGERS L. REV. 193, 195 (1987).
23. See Note, supra note 21, at 1073.
24. See Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 11, at 219-20.
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A. The Early Cases: 1971-1973
In its 1971 landmark decision, the California Supreme Court
in Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I)25 invalidated the state school
finance system on the grounds that it violated both state and
federal Equal Protection Clauses by making education "a function of the wealth of [the child's] parents and neighbors."2 6 Inspired by the success of Serrano I, education reformers promptly
filed lawsuits in more than thirty states challenging school finance systems.2 7
The United States Supreme Court's 1973 decision in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez" nonetheless
presented "a serious and unexpected setback to the movement
for school finance reform."29 The Court's ruling that wealth was
not a suspect classification and education was not a fundamental
right led to a minimal level of equal protection review, rather
than the so-called "strict scrutiny" test.3 ° Under strict scrutiny,
a state would have to prove that its school finance system was
"structured with 'precision,' and. . . 'tailored' narrowly to serve
legitimate objectives .. . ."" By applying the lower level of scrutiny, the Court concluded that the finance system was constitutional because it bore a rational relationship to "the state's legitimate interest in preserving local control of education."3 2
B. The Middle Cases: 1973-1988
Following the Rodriguez decision, state education reform
advocates turned to state constitutional provisions as the legal

25.
487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). In 1976 this case was brought a second time.
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, Clowes v.
Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
26.
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d at 1244.
27. See Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 11, at 223-24; see also Betsy Levin,
Current Trends In School Finance Reform Litigation: A Commentary, 1977 DUKE L.J.
1099 (1977).
28. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
29. Annette B. Johnson, State Court Intervention In School Finance Reform, 28
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 325, 331 (1979).
30. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS.,
SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN: IMPACT OF FISCAL INEQUITY ON THE EDUCATION OF STUDENTS AT RISK 7-8 (Com. Print 1991) (prepared by William L. Taylor and Dianne M.
Piche).
31. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16-17.
32. Julie K Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A
New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517, 522 (1991) (citing Rodriguez,
411 U.S. at 43).
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basis for school finance reform, beginning with Robinson v.
3 in 1973. In Robinson, the New Jersey Supreme Court
Cahill"
found the state's school finance system to be in violation of the
New Jersey Constitution Education Clause, which provided for
"a thorough and efficient system of free public schools ...."'
The success of the New Jersey suit reenergized the United
States school finance reform movement and produced a second
wave of legal challenges utilizing state Equal Protection or Education Clauses.3 5
1. Equal ProtectionClause
The use of a state Equal Protection Clause requires plaintiffs to argue that per-pupil expenditures in all state school districts should be equal. Under this "equality theory," a court must
find that the right to an education is fundamental, that wealth is
a suspect classification, or that the finance system is irrational.3" Most of the second wave cases relied primarily on Equal
Protection Clauses; however, only Arkansas,37 Wyoming,"
West Virginia," Connecticut,4" and California41 found their
state school finance systems unconstitutional based on such a
claim.
2. Education Clause
Alternatively, the language of state education clauses4 2 can

33. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
34. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; Robinson, 303 A.2d at 294.
35. See Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 11, at 228-29.
36. See Thro, The Significance, supra note 21, at 15.
37. Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983).
38. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 315 (Wyo.
1980).
39. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 863-64 (W. Va. 1979).
40. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977).
41. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 950 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied,
Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
42. See Thro, The Significance, supra note 21, at 16 n.45. Education clauses can
be grouped into four categories depending on the nature of the duty imposed upon
the state legislature by the language contained in the clause. Id. at 17 n.47. Category one simply establishes a free public school system. Id. Category one includes Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Vermont. Id. Category two imposes a minimum standard on the state school system,
such as New Jersey's "thorough and efficient system . . . ." Id. Category two includes
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, New Jersey, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsyl-
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be used to argue that education is "a fundamental right requiring a high level of scrutiny under equal-protection analysis," or
that the education offered throughout the state must meet certain minimum standards.' To prevail under the latter "quality"
theory, plaintiffs must show that the state public school system
does not meet mandated standards because of funding disparities." Although forty-nine states have Education Clauses,4 5
these provisions played a limited role in the early years of school
finance reform as litigants relied primarily on Equal Protection
Clauses." For example, during the second phase of school finance litigation, only New Jersey4 7 and Washington' found
their state school finance systems unconstitutional based exclusively on violations of their state Education Clauses.
Thus, despite the fact that the second wave of school finance
litigation spanned fifteen years and produced twenty-three lawsuits, from the perspective of education reform litigants, it cannot be deemed a success. Plaintiffs prevailed in seven of these
cases,49 but this relatively small number of victories was overshadowed by fifteen defeats. °

vania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Id. Category three
contains even stronger language, such as that contained in California's Education
Clause which states that "the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the
promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement." Id. at 1718 n.47. Category three includes California, Indiana, Iowa, Nevada, Rhode Island,
South Dakota. Id. Category four describes education in terms of Washington's "para" Id. at 18 n.47. Category
mount duty . . . ." and Georgia's "primary obligation ....
four includes Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Washington. Id.
43. See Underwood & Sparkman, supra note 32, at 533-34.
44. See Thro, The Significance, supra note 21, at 17.
45.
Mississippi is the only state without an Education Clause. The Mississippi
Constitution states that the establishment of a public school system is discretionary.
Thro, The Significance, supra note 21, at 16 n.44.
46. William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1646
(1989) [hereinafter Thro, To Render Them Safe].
47.
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
48. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
49. See supra notes 37-41, 47-48 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Britt v.
North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432, affd mem., 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C.
1987); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987);
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ. 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ. 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Board of Educ., Levittown Union
Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas 285
S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979);
Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); People ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 350
N.E.2d 767 (Ill. 1976).
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C. The Recent Cases: 1989 to the Present
In 1989, the Supreme Courts of Kentucky,5 1 Montana,5 2
and Texas" ignited the third phase of school finance reform
litigation by striking down their respective state school finance
systems. 4 The success of these cases was apparently attributable to three factors. First, the suits emphasized the quality of
the education offered rather than the equality of funding.5 Second, plaintiffs utilized each state's Education Clause to define
the legal duty imposed on the state in the area of the quality of
public education. This strategy allowed the three courts to sidestep equal protection questions, such as a fundamental right to
an education and wealth as a suspect class.5 Third, the three
courts appeared to adopt a more assertive approach towards
school finance reform. For instance, the Kentucky Supreme
Court ordered its legislature to redesign every aspect of public
education in the state; the Texas Supreme Court overturned
the Texas Legislature's proposal to remedy deficiencies following
the first school finance lawsuit;" and the Montana Supreme
Court invalidated the state's school finance system which the
court had previously upheld. 9
Despite the emphasis placed on education clauses by courts
and plaintiffs, however, equal protection arguments are still an
important factor in school finance lawsuits." In Tennessee
Small School Systems v. McWherter,6" for example, after finding
an "enforceable standard" of educational opportunity in the Education Clause, the Tennessee Supreme Court invalidated the
education finance system by focusing almost exclusively on the
state's Equal Protection Clause.62
Thus, the last quarter-century of education litigation has

51. Rose v. Council For Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
52. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684
(1989).
53. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
54. See Thro, The Significance, supra note 21, at 19.
55. Id.
56. See Thro, The Significance, supra note 21, at 19-20.
57. Rose v. Council For Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989).
58. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
59. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 52-56, 769 P.2d
684, 689-91 (1989).
60. See Thro, The Significance, supra note 21, at 19-20 (discussing the equal
protection argument that framed the Tennessee decision).
61. 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).
62. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys., 851 S.W.2d at 152-56.
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produced mixed results. Plaintiffs have successfully challenged
education finance systems in fourteen states: Arizona, New Jersey, Alabama, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Texas, Kentucky, Montana, Arkansas, Wyoming, West Virginia, Washington, Connecticut, California.63 In contrast, courts have upheld finance systems in eighteen states: North Dakota, Virginia, Idaho, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Wisconsin, South Carolina, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Michigan, Maryland, Colorado, New York, Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois." Although courts are divided
nearly evenly on the issue of school finance reform, there is no
clear consensus about which legal theory-quality or equality-will most likely produce a plaintiffs victory.
III. DISABLED STUDENTS' LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION
A. Litigation
Advocates for disabled students started to litigate the
students' right to an education at about the same time as the
school finance reform advocates started their efforts. 5 In one of

63. Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz.
1994); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1994); Alabama Coalition for Equity v.
Hunt, appendix to Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993);
McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993);
Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236
Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90
(Ark. 1983); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.
1980); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977);
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
64. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994); Scott
v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn.
1993); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993); Coalition for Equitable Sch.
Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis.
1989); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. App.), affd mem., 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C.
1987); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987);
East Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303 (Mich. 1984); Hornbeck v. Somerset
County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ.,
649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v.
Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga.
1981); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Danson v. Casey, 399
A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); People ex. rel. Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. 1976).
65.

Larry Bartlett, Economic Cost Factors in Providing a Free Appropriate Pub-

lic Education for Handicapped Children: The Legal Perspective, 22 J.L. & EDUC. 27,
29-30 (1993).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1996

9

160

Montana
Law Review,LAW
Vol. 57
[1996], Iss. 1, Art. 6
MONTANA
REVIEW

[Vol. 57

the earliest decisions addressing this issue, Pennsylvania Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth,6 6 the district court
concluded that the right to an education is guaranteed by the
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the United States
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment.6 7 Moreover, the court
held that a school district cannot use a handicapping condition to
exclude a child from a public education to which the child is
entitled. 8
Another important decision concerning equal educational
opportunity for the handicapped came in Mills v. Board of Education.69 Once again relying on the Due Process Clause, the
court held that handicapped students have a constitutional right
to an education "regardless of the degree of the child's mental,
physical, or emotional disability or impairment."" Furthermore,
in a ruling that has important implications for school finance reform, the court rejected the defendant's argument that inadequate funding relieved a school district's duty to provide for the
student's education. The court declared: "The inadequacies of
the ... Public School System whether occasioned by insufficient
funding or administrative inefficiency, certainly cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the 'exceptional' or handicapped
child than on the normal child."7 1
The Rodriguez decision also implicated the rights of disabled
students by finding no federal constitutional right to an education." However, the ruling assumes that students are offered a
minimally adequate education.73 This assumption has lead commentators to argue that Rodriguez may not apply to disabled
students denied the opportunity to receive an appropriate education. 4 Indeed, several post-Rodriguez lawsuits suggested that

66.
343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
67. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children, 343 F. Supp. at 295-96. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
68. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children, 343 F. Supp. at 296-97; see
Rosalie Levinson, The Right to a Minimally Adequate Education for Learning Disabled Children, 12 VAL. U. L. REV. 253, 261 (1978).
69.
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
70. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878.
71. Id. at 876.
72.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973).
73. Id. at 36-37.
74.
See Levinson, supra note 68, at 263-64.
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even though disabled students are not physically excluded from
the classroom, they are "constructively excluded"75 if they are
not receiving a minimally adequate education appropriate to
their needs.7"
B. Legislation
The debate concerning these constitutional issues with respect to the needs of disabled children declined with the passage
of federal legislation that linked their access to an appropriate
education to a state's acceptance of federal funds.7" Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 19737" provides that "no otherwise
qualified handicapped individual in the United States... shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, or be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... , Moreover, the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (EAHCA) ° enacted in 1975 ensures that disabled
students are not denied the opportunity to meaningfully participate in a federally funded educational program."1 Drawing on
legal principles articulated in Mills and Pennsylvania Ass'n for
Retarded Children, EAHCA established as a national goal the
education of all handicapped children between the ages of three
and eighteen.8 2 The statute provided financial assistance to participating states 3 in return for assurance that a state provide

75. See Levinson, supra note 68, at 264.
76. See, e.g., Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 957-59 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(ruling that Rodriguez does not preclude a finding that disabled students have a
right to a minimally adequate education); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (concluding that students with specific learning disabilities are entitled to an appropriate minimally adequate educational opportunity).
77. See Rapp, supra note 6, at 122.
78. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
79. Id. Earlier measures enacted by Congress to address the education of disabled students include the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), Pub. L. No. 91230, Title VI, 84 Stat. 175 (1970), and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,
Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966).
80. Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), Pub. L. No. 94-142,
89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 (1994)).
81. See Judith W. Wegner, Educational Rights of Handicapped Children: Three
Federal Statutes and an Evolving Jurisprudence Part I: The Statutory Maze, 17 J.L.
& EDUC. 387, 400 (1988).
82. EAHCA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(9) (1988).
83. All states are currently receiving federal funds under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). This funding was originally designed to provide up
to forty percent of the special education costs that exceeded the amount spent on

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1996

11

162

Montana
Law Review,
Vol. 57
[1996], Iss. 1, Art. 6
MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 57

"a free appropriate public education" to all handicapped children
based on each child's individual needs.8 4 In 1990, Congress
amended EAHCA by changing the name to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)."5 Although Congress did not
materially alter the law, the amendment symbolized a rejection
of the patronizing attitude associated with the term "handicapped" and demonstrated a renewed interest in the education of
the nation's disabled citizens.8 6
Under IDEA's mandate for a free appropriate public education, school districts must offer disabled students a special education program that benefits them.8 7 However, the statute's lack
of guidance on the amount of benefit and the cost of the special
education program has been the source of continuing litigation.8" In Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central
School District v. Rowley,89 the United States Supreme Court
attempted to clarify the statute's intent by declaring that the Act
only guarantees a "'basic floor of opportunity' . . sufficient to
confer some educational benefits." ° Courts have interpreted this
ruling to mean that school districts need not provide an educational program to maximize each disabled student's potential.9 1
Courts have been equally clear, however, that disabled students
must receive a basic level of educational opportunity regardless
of budgetary constraints.2

nondisabled students. However, federal funding has never exceeded twelve percent of
these costs. Thus, the responsibility for financing most of the special education services has fallen to the states and local school districts. Martha M. McCarthy, Can
Costs Be Considered in Special Education Placements, 22 J.L. & EDUC. 265, 265-66
(1993); see infra note 85.
84. EAHCA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18), 1412(1), 1412(2)(B) (1988).
85.
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Pub. L. No. 101-476, §
901(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1103, 1142 (1990) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1994)) (modifying
legislation found at Pub. L. No. 102-119 § 25(b)).
86.
See Rapp, supra note 6, at 124.
87. See McCarthy, supra note 83, at 266.
88. See Bartlett, supra note 65, at 31-32.
89.
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
90. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., Hessler v. State Bd. of Educ. of Md., 700 F.2d 134, 139 (4th Cir.
1983) (ruling that the disabled student must be placed in a special education program that is designed to allow the student to derive some educational benefit).
92.
See, e.g., Burke County Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 982 (4th Cir.
1990) (finding that an appropriate special education placement cannot be based on
financial considerations); Kerr Center Parents Ass'n v. Charles, 581 F. Supp. 166,
168 (D. Or. 1983) (concluding that school districts have a duty to provide disabled
students with an appropriate education regardless of budgetary constraints); Yaris v.
Special Sch. Dist., 558 F. Supp. 545, 559 (E.D. Mo. 1983), affd, 728 F.2d 1055 (8th
Cir. 1984) ("[Ilnadequacy of funds does not relieve a state from its obligation to as-
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Thus, disabled students have moved away from the constitutional challenges of the 1970's and are now relying on federal
statutes, such as IDEA, to assert their right to an education. In
response to this approach, the courts have held that states receiving federal funding under IDEA have an obligation to provide an appropriate educational program for all disabled students without regard to the availability of adequate funding. 3
Despite this direction from the judiciary, financial constraints
continue to impair the education of disabled students across the
country. As discussed in the next section, Alabama has recently
addressed this issue in the context of a public school reform
lawsuit.
IV. THE ALABAMA DECISION

In May 1990, proponents of education reform in Alabama
joined other recent litigants by filing suit in that state's circuit
court claiming that Alabama's public school system "does not
offer equitable and adequate educational opportunities to the
schoolchildren of the state . . . ."" In January 1991, this suit
was followed by a similar suit brought on behalf of disabled
students in the state. 5 The court combined the two suits for
trial, and, after an exhaustive review of Alabama's public school
system, entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs on April 1,
1993.96 The decision was not appealed; however, the Alabama
Senate asked the Alabama Supreme Court to give an advisory
opinion on the issue of compliance with the circuit court's order.9 7 After reviewing the doctrines of separation of powers and
judicial jurisdiction, the supreme court concluded that "the Legislature is required to follow the order of the Circuit Court.""

sure the handicapped child of equal access.").
93.
See Bartlett, supra note 65, at 51.
94. Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, appendix to Opinion of the
Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 110-67 (Ala. 1993). This consolidated decision can
also be found on Westlaw as Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90883-R, CV-91-0117-R, 1993 WL 204083 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1993).
95.
Harper v. Hunt, No. CV-91-117-R (Ala. Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 19, 1991) (consolidated with Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, appendix to Opinion of the
Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 110-67 (Ala. 1993)).
96. Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993).
97.
Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993); ALA. CODE §
12-2-10 (1986 & Supp. 1994) (giving the Alabama Supreme Court authority to render
advisory opinions).
98.
Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d at 109.
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A. Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt
Alabama Coalition adopts the same approach to litigation as
many recent education reform litigants who argued that the
failure to provide equal educational opportunity violated state
Education and Equal Protection Clauses.99 In analyzing these
claims, the court looked to the intent of the framers of the 1901
State Constitution, and found that Alabama has always had a
strong commitment to education.'00 The state's Education
Clause does not include terms common to other state constitutions, such as "equality," "adequacy," or "efficiency." However, it
directs the state to "establish, organize, and maintain a liberal
system of public schools .....
, The court concluded that this
language affords "school children of the state the right to a quality education that is generous in its own provisions and that
meets minimum standards of adequacy."" 2
Moreover, while acknowledging that there is no explicit
reference to a fundamental right to education in Alabama's Constitution, the court determined that there is "ample additional
evidence of the fundamental character of the right to education
in the constitution, laws, history, and practice of the state of
Alabama."0 3 Therefore, "Alabama's present system of public
schools violates the constitutional right of plaintiffs to equal
educational opportunity as guaranteed by Alabama Constitution,
article XIV, section 256.' ' °
The court next addressed plaintiffs' claim that the Alabama
public school system violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
State Constitution.' Having found a fundamental right to an
education, the court used strict scrutiny to review the state sys-

99. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
100. Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 154.
101.
"The legislature shall establish, organize, and maintain a liberal system of
public schools throughout the state for the benefit of the children thereof." ALA.
CONST. art. XIV, § 256.
102. Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 154.
103. Id. at 157.
104. Id. at 151; ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; see supra note 101.
105. "Sections 1, 6, and 22 of Article I, Constitution of Alabama 1901, combine
to guarantee the citizens of Alabama equal protection under the laws." Plitt v.
Griggs, 585 So. 2d 1317, 1325 (Ala. 1991); "[A]ll men are equally free and independent; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." ALA. CONST. art. I, § 1;
No man shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law."
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; "[N]o . . . law . . . making any irrevocable or exclusive
grants of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed by the legislature." ALA.
CONST. art. I, § 22.
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tem of public schools. 0 6 Adoption of this standard was not critical to plaintiffs' success, however, because the court found a
"stark record of educational deficiencies in schools across Alabama,""°7 and held that "no matter what standard of equal protection review is employed, the present system of public schools
in Alabama violates the Constitution of Alabama article I, sections 1, 6, and 22. " 0°"
Finally, the court examined plaintiffs' claim that the education offered to Alabama's students was inadequate, thus violating due process as established by article I, sections 6' and
130 of the Alabama Constitution."' The court reasoned that
because the compulsory school attendance law places a limitation
on the liberty of students, the state has an affirmative duty to
provide students with an adequate education as defined by the
constitution, laws, and regulations governing public education."' In addition, Alabama students have a "property interest
or entitlement with respect to public education under Alabama
law."" The court found that Alabama schoolchildren are being
arbitrarily and unjustifiably deprived of an education that meets
the minimum state standards, and this deprivation violates the
due process guarantees of the Alabama Constitution."'
B. Harper v. Hunt"5
In the second and perhaps most far-reaching part of the
Alabama Coalition lawsuit, the circuit court found that children
with disabilities are entitled to the same constitutional right to
"an equitable and adequate education as all other schoolchildren

106. Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 156.
107. Id. at 155. The evidence at trial showed that many of the state's school
facilities were in poor condition with leaking roofs, overflowing septic tanks, unsanitary bathrooms, broken windows, and insect infestation. Id. at 130-31. Large class
size, outdated textbooks, and deficiencies in curricular offerings also illustrated the
inadequacies of the Alabama school system. Id. at 132-34.
108. Id. at 161.
109. AA- CONST. art. I, § 6; see supra note 105.
110. "[Elvery person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or
" ALA. CONST. art. I, §
reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of law ....
13.
111. Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, 624 So. 2d 107, 161 (Ala. 1993).
112. Id. at 161-62.
113. Id. at 162.
114. Id.
115. As explained above, Harper v. Hunt was combined with Alabama Coalition
for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt for trial. Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 111.
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in Alabama." 116 In addition to the analysis articulated above,

however, plaintiffs raised two other issues unique to disabled
students: (1) under Alabama law,11 7 whether children with disabilities have a statutory right to an appropriate education and
special services;1 and (2) whether the financing system for
special education programs is irrational and violates the Due
Process Clause of the Alabama Constitution.' These issues
created a case of first impression in Alabama, and required the
court to determine if disabled students could invoke a state statute to assert a constitutional right to an appropriate education.
The court began its analysis by examining the text of the
statutes and found a clear statement of legislative intent to provide disabled students with a "free appropriate public education."
The court then examined identical language in the
regulations governing both the federal IDEA and the Alabama
special education programs. 21 Finding that a state must adopt
this guarantee in order to be eligible to receive federal funds
under IDEA, the court concluded that the Alabama statutory and
regulatory language cannot be construed "differently from the
federal meaning without ignoring the clear intent of the Alabama 22legislature to benefit from federal aid to special educa1
tion."

With this similarity of construction in hand, the court next
looked to the federal law established in Board of Education of
Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley to define the
term "appropriate."12 The court determined that a "free appro-

priate public education" must include "specialized instruction
and related services which are individually designed to provide
educational benefit to the child with disabilities." 24 The court
116. Id. at 162.
117. "Each school board shall not provide less than 12 consecutive years of appropriate instruction and special services for exceptional children . . . ." ALA. CODE §
16-39-3 (1987 & Supp. 1994). "There is hereby established a preschool special education program for children with disabilities, ages three through five years, inclusive.
All county and city local education agencies are required to provide free appropriate
public education for all eligible children with disabilities, ages three through five
years, inclusive, in accordance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act . . . ." ALA. CODE § 16-39A-2 (1987 & Supp. 1994).

118.
119.
120.
121.
CODE r.
122.
123.
124.

Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 162.
Id.
Id. at 163.
Id.; 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.8, 300.121, 300.122, 300.300-.383 (1995); ALA. ADMIN.
290-080-090-.08(2) (1993).
Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 163.
458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982); see supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 163-64 (citing Board of Educ. of Hendrick
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concluded that because of serious deficiencies in the state special
education program, including staffing, curriculum, and related
resources, Alabama is not in compliance with the statutory obligations imposed by Alabama law.'25
Plaintiffs also asserted that the special education financing
system in Alabama is unconstitutional because it violates the
state Due Process Clause.'26 Plaintiffs based this claim on
Alabama's method of funding special education. The total enrollment method distributes funds to schools according to the total
number of regular and special education students in the school
district."' This funding method is not connected to the costs of
special education services, and, consequently, penalizes school
' As the
systems that seek to fulfill the statutes' mandate. 28
court noted, under this regime, an increase in the number of
special education students served by a school district results in a
decrease in per-pupil expenditures.'29 Thus, the court held that
the special education funding system violates the Due Process
Clause of the Alabama Constitution because it is arbitrary, "irrational and has no relationship to the public interest in appropriately educating students with disabilities."'30
C. The Alabama Remedy
In June 1995, the Alabama Legislature passed a school reform plan in response to the mandate contained in Alabama
Coalition.'3 ' In an effort to comply with "the essential principles and features of the 'liberal system of public schools' required
by the Alabama Constitution,"'32 the Legislature crafted a finance plan committed to equalizing state funding. The plan
utilizes a foundation program which allocates money to local
boards of education based on specific state requirements, such as

Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982)).
125. Id. at 164; ALA. CODE §§ 16-39-3, 16-39A-2 (1987 & Supp. 1994); see supra
note 117.
126. Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 162; ALA. CONST. art. I, §§ 6 and 13;
supra notes 105, 110.
127. Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 164.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
Act of July 7, 1995, No. 95-313, 1995 Ala. Acts __ (codified as amended at
131.
ALA. CODE § 16-6B-1 to -12 (1995)); Act of July 7, 1995, No. 95-314, 1995 Ala. Acts
(codified as amended in scattered sections of ALA. CODE, tit. 16, 25, 40 (1995)).
Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, 624 So. 2d 107, 165 (Ala. 1993);
132.
ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256.
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length of school year, teachers' salaries, student populations, student-teacher ratios, and special education costs.'33 The new law
accomplishes this objective by shifting funds from wealthy districts to poor districts in an attempt to equalize the educational
The law also provides for
opportunity offered statewide.3
minimum spending levels based on student enrollment,'3 5 but
imposes no cap on the amount a district may spend.'3 6
This approach would initially reduce spending disparities
between districts; however, it may not completely eliminate the
education inequities described by the court in Alabama Coalition. For example, the legislature's reliance on shifting funds
rather than providing additional funding sources may ultimately
result in insufficient funds to meet the educational standards
3 7 Furthermore, if property
identified in Alabama Coalition.'
rich districts elect to increase spending through additional property taxes, the gap between rich and poor districts would once
again surface in violation of the state's Equal Protection Clause.
In short, while this education reform package goes a long way
toward remedying the deficiencies of the Alabama public school
system, it is not entirely clear that the level of equal educational
opportunity afforded by the measure is sufficient to meet the
demands of the constitution as defined by Alabama Coalition.

V. THE MONTANA DECISION
A. Finding Montana's School Finance System Unconstitutional
The Alabama school reform lawsuit was preceded by a Montana Supreme Court decision in Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State,'as which held that the system of financing
Montana's public schools was unconstitutional. Like Alabama
Coalition, the court based this decision on the Education Clause
of the Montana Constitution.' 9 However, unlike Alabama's di-

133. Act of July 7, 1995, No. 95-314.
134. See id.
135. This funding method attempts to provide adequate resources for special education through a weighted system. The system designates funds based on 5% of the
total student population at a rate that is 2.5 times the regular per-pupil allocation.
For example, a school district with 1000 students would receive funding for 50 disabled students at a rate that is 2.5 times higher than the funding allocated for nondisabled students. Act of July 7, 1995, No. 95-314.
136. Id.
137. Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 165-66; see infra note 148.
138. 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989).
139. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1 states: "It is the goal of the people to establish a
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rective to "establish, organize, and maintain a liberal system of
public schools," 1" Montana's Constitution guarantees that the
state will provide "equality of educational opportunity" to all
schoolchildren through "a basic system of free quality public"
education."" Therefore, after reviewing evidence of large spending disparities between rich and poor school districts,'4 2 and
the resultant inequities in the level of education provided,1"
the court found a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee
of equal educational opportunity. ' "
The court's finding that the school funding system was unconstitutional under the Education Clause allowed the court to
avoid the issue of equal protection and the related questions of
education as a fundamental right and wealth as a suspect
class.'" This contrasts sharply with Alabama Coalition,
which not only found a fundamental right to an education, but
also held that the state system of public schools violated the
Education Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the Alabama Constitution. 14
Another significant aspect of the Helena Elementary decision
involves the court's conclusion that state accreditation standards
represent "minimum standards upon which quality education
must be built ... [and] do not fully define either the constitutional rights of students or the constitutional responsibilities of
the State of Montana for funding its public elementary and secondary schools."'4 Despite this apparent commitment to educasystem of education which will develop the full educational potential of each person.
Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person in the state ...
The legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality public elementary and
secondary schools."
140. ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; see also supra note 101.
141. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; see also supra note 139.
142. Helena Elementary, 236 Mont. at 48, 769 P.2d at 686 (finding "disparities of
spending per pupil as high as 8 to 1 in comparisons between similarly-sized school
districts").
143. Id. at 50-51, 769 P.2d at 687-88 (concluding that funding disparities caused
significant differences in educational opportunities in the areas of science, home economics, industrial arts, language arts, foreign languages, physical education, music,
art, gifted and talented programs, computers, library and media center services, extracurricular activities, and basic maintenance and development of facilities).
144. Id. at 55, 769 P.2d at 690.
145.
Using an equal protection analysis, the district court found that education is
a fundamental right. The Montana Supreme Court, however, stated "[blecause we
have concluded that the school funding system is unconstitutional under Art. X, Section 1, Mont. Const., we do not find it necessary to consider the equal protection
issue . . . and in particular do not rule upon the determination by the District Court
that education is a fundamental right." Id. at 55, 769 P.2d at 691.
146. See supra notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
147. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 57, 769 P.2d
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tional quality, the court failed to delineate the elements of a
quality education system which would pass constitutional muster. Alabama Coalition, on the other hand, prescribed detailed
requirements for Alabama's public education system, including
such traditional skills as reading, math, and science; knowledge
of social and civic responsibilities; principles of physical and
mental health; and an appreciation of the arts."
B. The Montana Remedy
Rather than providing judicial guidance regarding the state's
"constitutional responsibilities" articulated in Helena Elementary, the court simply instructed the Montana Legislature to
"search for and present an equitable system of school funding."149 The legislature initially responded to this order in 1989
with House Bill 28. This Bill was designed to increase levels of
funding for school districts throughout the state.15 ° However,
684, 692 (1989).
148. Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993) stated:
[T]he essential principles and features of the "liberal system of public
schools" required by the Alabama Constitution include the following: . . . (e)
adequate educational opportunities shall consist of, at a minimum, an education that provides students with opportunity to attain the following: (i)
sufficient oral and written communication skills to function in Alabama, and
at the national and international levels, in the coming years; (ii) sufficient
mathematic and scientific skills to function in Alabama, and at the national
and international levels, in the coming years; (iii) sufficient knowledge of
economic, social, and political systems generally, and of the history, politics,
and social structure of Alabama and the United States, specifically, to enable the student to make informed choices; (iv) sufficient understanding of
governmental processes and of basic civic institutions to enable the student
to understand and contribute to the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (v) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of principles of health and mental hygiene to enable the student to monitor and
contribute to his or her own physical and mental well-being; (vi) sufficient
understanding of the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her
cultural heritage and the cultural heritages of others; (vii) sufficient training, or preparation for advanced training, in academic or vocational skills,
and sufficient guidance, to enable each child to choose and pursue life work
intelligently; (viii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable
public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in Alabama, in surrounding states, across the nation, and throughout the world,
in academics or in the job market; and (ix) sufficient support and guidance
so that every student feels a sense of self-worth and ability to achieve, and
so that every student is encouraged to live up to his or her full human
potential.
Id. at 165-66.
149. Helena Elementary, 236 Mont. at 59, 769 P.2d at 693.
150. Act of Aug. 11, 1989, ch. 11, 1989 Mont. Laws 2568 (codified as amended
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plaintiffs in Helena Elementary found this legislative response
insufficient, and sued again alleging that the funding system
under House Bill 28 was unconstitutional. 5'1 In addition, the
Montana Rural Education Association brought a similar suit
against the state.' 2 In 1993, the legislature tried another solution in House Bill 667.153 This Bill repealed the provisions of
House Bill 28 and outlined a more comprehensive plan which set
minimum and maximum spending levels for school districts
based on student enrollment.'54 However, a subsequent voter
rejection of a state income tax measure designed to fund the plan
reduced the state's contribution by approximately $20 million." House Bill 667 has thus equalized minimum funding
levels between districts, but not increased the overall level of
funding.
Plaintiffs in the Helena Elementary and Montana Rural
EducationAss'n lawsuits assert that the latest legislative remedy is also unconstitutional because it provides inadequate funding levels and requires voter approval for any increase, including
costs associated with rising student populations.'5 6 No trial
date has been set, however, as litigants are in the process of
collecting data related to the new funding system. If the funding
levels of the latest legal remedy result in judgments for plaintiffs
in these cases, the Montana Supreme Court will have another
opportunity to consider whether education is a fundamental
right in Montana and to define the elements of a quality education in the context of the Education Clause."' Such a holding
would provide specificity to the legislature, which, in turn, would
allow it to design a funding system that equalizes funding, satisfies the Education Clause of the Montana Constitution, and

in scattered sections of MONT. CODE ANN., tit. 2, 7, 15, 17, 20, 23, 90 (1995)).
151. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, No. BDV-91-1334 (1st Dist.
Ct. Mont. filed Aug. 15, 1991).
152. Montana Rural Educ. Ass'n v. State, No. BDV-91-2065 (lst Dist. Ct. Mont.
filed Dec. 10, 1991).
153.
Act of May 12, 1993, ch. 633, 1993 Mont. Laws 2776 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of MONT. CODE. ANN., tit. 20 (1995)).
154. Id.
155. Telephone conversation with and written information provided by Madalyn
Quinlan, Revenue Analyst, Office of Public Instruction, State of Montana (June 26,
1995).
156. Helena Elementary, No. BDV-91-1334; Montana Rural Educ. Ass'n, No. BDV91-2065.
157. See Wayne Buchanan & Deborah A. Verstegen, School Finance Litigation in
Montana, 66 WEST'S EDUC. LAw REP. 19, 31-32 (1991).
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provides a quality education to all students.'
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALABAMA COALITION DECISION

A. ComparingMontana and Alabama Special Education
Statutes
Unlike the Alabama Circuit Court in Alabama Coalition, the
Montana Supreme Court in Helena Elementary did not explicitly
address disabled students' constitutional right to an education. 5"' 9 Instead, the court found that disabled and nondisabled
students are guaranteed equal educational opportunity by the
Constitution."6 Indeed, the 1993 passage of Senate Bill 348,
amending the special education finance system,' was a part of
the larger school finance reform legislation enacted in response
to the Helena Elementary decision.'6 2 Thus, Senate Bill 348
could be construed as an implicit recognition by the Montana
Legislature that disabled students are entitled to the same equal
education access as regular education students.
Legislative intent in regard to the special education finance
system takes on particular significance when comparing the
Montana and the Alabama special education statutes. As discussed above, the Alabama statutes provide for not less than
twelve consecutive years of free appropriate public education for
disabled students between the ages of three and eighteen
years." Similarly, the Montana statutes establish a free appropriate public education for disabled students ages three
through eighteen years."6 In addition, both the Montana and

158. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1.
159. See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
161. Law of Apr. 21, 1993, ch. 466, 1993 Mont. Laws 1649 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of MONT. CODE ANN., tit. 20 (1995)); see also Senate Hearing on
Senate Bill 348, 53d Leg. 7-9 (1993).
162.
See Senate Hearing on Senate Bill 348, 53d Leg. 7-9 (1993).

163. ALA. CODE §§ 16-39-3, 16-39A-2 (1987 & Supp. 1994); see also supra note
117.
164. "All children with disabilities in Montana are entitled to a free appropriate
public education . . . ." MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-7-411(1) (1995); "The board of trustees of every school district shall provide or establish and maintain a special education program for each child with disabilities between the ages of 6 and 18, inclusive."
Id. at § 20-7-411(2); "The board of trustees of each elementary district shall provide
or establish and maintain a special education program for each preschool child with
disabilities between the ages of 3 and 6, inclusive." Id. at § 20-7-411(3). In addition,
"[p]rograms may be established for persons with disabilities between the ages of 0
and 21 when the superintendent of public instruction and the trustees" in an individual district conclude that the programs will provide educational benefit for the indi-
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Alabama administrative regulations contain the same requirement for a free appropriate public education as the federal IDEA
statute.'6 5 Therefore, using an analysis similar to that employed in Alabama Coalition, a Montana court could conclude
that the special education statute is designed to guarantee the
rights provided by IDEA-that disabled students have a state
statutory right to an appropriate education. As the final step in
the analysis, the court could adopt the Alabama Court's interpretation of the term "appropriate" by examining Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, which
determined that disabled students must be provided with individually designed instruction from which they can derive some
educational benefit. 1
B. Supporting a Due Process Challenge
In Alabama Coalition, the court used the Due Process
Clause to overturn the finance system for the special education
program on the grounds that it was arbitrary and not rationally
related to a legitimate public interest.'6 ' The court based this
ruling on a finding that disabled students are entitled to an
appropriate education under state law and that this right rises
to the level of a protected interest for the purpose of due process
review.'" Furthermore, the court ruled that this right requires
the financing method for the special education program to be
tied to the actual costs of educating disabled students. 9
Alabama's total enrollment method of financing the special education program was not connected to the needs of individual disabled students and, therefore, the court found the financing
system unconstitutional.'" °
In contrast, the Montana special education finance system
allocates instructional and related services block grants to school
districts based on total student population; however, the statute
also provides for reimbursements to districts affected by disproportionate educational costs.'' In addition, special education

vidual. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-7-412 (1995) (emphasis added).
\
165.
MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.104 (1993); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-080-090-.08(2)
(1993).
166. 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982); see supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
167. Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, 624 So. 2d 107, 164 (Ala. 1993).
168. Id. at 162-64.
169. Id. at 164.
170. Id.; see also supra notes 126-30.
171. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-9-321 (1995).
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funds may only be spent for costs directly related to the program.' 2 These provisions directly link the special education
funds and the students being served by the funds. Thus, it is
unlikely that a Montana court would overturn the special education funding system currently in place using the rational basis
test under the Due Process Clause.
It is important to recognize, however, that courts finding a
fundamental right to an education would likely use a much higher level of scrutiny for due process review.' 3 Using strict scrutiny, the court would find the law invalid unless it is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.'7 4
C. Moving Beyond a 'Free Appropriate Public Education'
Disabled students' right to an appropriate education has
traditionally been limited to a basic level of educational benefit
as defined by state and federal law.' 5 Alabama Coalition is
significant because it raises this floor for disabled students.
Through the use of the Alabama Education and Equal Protection
Clauses, the court determined that all schoolchildren in the
state, regular education and special education students alike, are
entitled to a "quality education."' 7' The court then defined the
components of this term. 77 The effect of this ruling allows disabled students in Alabama to assert their right to a quality education through the use of state constitutional provisions, rather
than using state statutes which only provide a basic level of
educational opportunity. Thus, disabled students in states with
similar constitutional provisions could cite Alabama Coalition to
claim a right to a higher level of educational benefit than is
currently required by state and federal law.
VII. CONCLUSION

Alabama Coalition is unique in that it combined a disabled
students' lawsuit with a school reform lawsuit. This union allowed the court to accord both regular and special education
students a full panoply of rights based on the Education, Equal

172. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-7-431 (1995).
173. JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 167 (3rd ed. 1995).
174. Id.
175.
See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
176. Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, 624 So. 2d 107, 154 (Ala. 1993).
177. Id. at 165-66; see supra note 148.
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Protection, and Due Process Clauses of the Alabama Constitution. 78 In addition, the court determined that special education
students have a statutory right to an appropriate education, and,
further, that the special education
finance system was in viola79
Clause.
Process
Due
the
tion of
As advocates for disabled students continue to develop litigation strategies, the Alabama Coalition decision could affect the
outcome of such cases in other states, like Montana, with constitutional and statutory provisions similar to Alabama's. Moreover,
if other state courts follow Alabama's lead, disabled students
nationwide will have the opportunity to pursue their right to an
appropriate education using state constitutional provisions. Such
a development would afford disabled students a standard of
educational opportunity above the basic level currently offered by
state statutes. In that event, Alabama Coalition will certainly be
regarded as a landmark decision in the area of disabled students'
litigation.

178. Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 110-67; see supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
179. Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 110-67; see supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
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